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A NAFTA 
RETROSPECTIVE
In this special issue, 
Dallas Fed economists 
look at NAFTA’s effect on
U.S.–Mexico trade. 
David Gould develops a 
model to disentangle the
treaty’s effects from those 
of the peso crisis. Jeremy
Nalewaik and Lori Taylor
extend the analysis to
Texas–Mexico trade.
ERCHANDISE TRADE is a significant economic link be-
tween Texas and neighboring Mexico. In 1995, Texas ex-
ported nearly $22 billion in merchandise to Mexico and
imported at least $14 billion in Mexican merchandise.
1 As
such, trade with Mexico represents a bigger share of the
Texas economy than oil and gas extraction.
Recently, Texas–Mexico trade has gone through a series of dra-
matic changes. The implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is one such change. Another was the
sharp drop in the value of the peso in December 1994 and subse-
quent fall in Mexican output. Both the Mexican economy and the
value of the peso have since staged comebacks, further changing the
Texas trade picture. This article describes the flow of merchandise
trade between Texas and Mexico, assesses the relative impacts of
NAFTA and the peso crisis on Texas trade flows, and examines the
outlook for Texas merchandise trade with Mexico.
M s
s
Texas exports affected more than its importsAn Overview of Texas Trade with Mexico
Given the proximity of Texas and
Mexico, it is not surprising that Mexico
is Texas’ biggest international export
market. From 1988 to 1993, exports to
Mexico accounted for 33 percent of
Texas exports to the world. Since 1994,
this proportion has increased to nearly
36 percent.
Electronics and electrical equipment,
transportation equipment, and indus-
trial machinery and computer equip-
ment make up most of Texas’ exports 
to Mexico. Together these industries
have accounted for nearly 50 percent 
of Texas exports to Mexico since 1988;
the electronics and electrical equipment
industry alone has accounted for more
than 26 percent. Furthermore, Texas
frequently sells more than half of its
electronics and electrical equipment ex-
ports and almost half of its transporta-
tion equipment exports to Mexico.
Mexico accounts for roughly 15 to 20
percent of Texas exports of industrial
machinery and computers.
Not only is Mexico a large market 
for Texas products, but it has tradition-
ally been a rapidly growing market
(Chart 1). Since 1987, Texas exports 
to Mexico have grown 14 percent per
year (after adjustment for inflation). In
contrast, total exports to other foreign
countries have grown only 9 percent
per year. Although exports to Mexico
contracted sharply with the onset of the
peso crisis, they resumed their upward
trend in third-quarter 1995.
The pattern of Texas imports is not
as well documented as the pattern of
exports. However, data on transborder
surface freight between Texas and 
Mexico illustrate most of the pattern of
trade (goods shipped by air and sea are
excluded).
2 The surface freight data in-
dicate that Texas is a substantial im-
porter of Mexican goods. Since April
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Chart 1
Texas Exports to Mexico
A Historically Strong Growth Record
Billions of 1995 dollars
(Quarterly data)
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Chart 2
U.S. and Texas Imports
From Mexico
U.S. Imports Grow Faster
Index, 1993:9 = 100
(Six-month moving average of monthly data)
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The Role of Maquiladoras in U.S. Trade with Mexico
Maquiladoras are Mexican firms with special tariff status. Maquiladoras import components and raw materials
that are exempt from Mexican tariffs and use those imports to produce export goods. If the goods are exported
to the United States, the U.S. content of the goods is also exempt from U.S. tariffs.
Trade with maquiladoras has been a major influence on U.S. trade with Mexico. The U.S. International 
Trade Commission estimates that nearly one-quarter of U.S. exports to Mexico in 1994 were destined for
maquiladora firms. Most of those temporary exports then returned as the duty-free content of U.S. imports 
from maquiladoras. In 1994, maquiladora products made up nearly half of total U.S. imports from Mexico, and
temporary exports reentering the United States made up over half the value of those maquiladora imports.
Maquiladoras have been particularly important to transborder trade in transportation equipment, apparel, 
electronics, industrial machinery and instruments.
NAFTA and the peso crisis likely affected the maquiladora trade in ways that were different from their effects
on exports and imports in general. Because U.S. content is not subject to tariffs, NAFTA probably had no effect
on U.S. exports to maquiladoras and only limited effects on U.S. imports from maquiladoras. Furthermore, 
U.S. exports to maquiladoras are only temporary and were not reduced by declines in Mexican purchasing 
power. Instead, the peso devaluation made it more cost-effective to assemble products in Mexico and probably
increased U.S. exports to maquiladora firms. In turn, the increase in U.S. exports to maquiladoras probably 
fostered a corresponding increase in U.S. imports from maquiladoras.1993, Texas has consistently purchased
at least one-quarter of U.S. surface im-
ports from Mexico.
Interestingly, the leading import 
industries generally correspond to 
the leading export industries. As with
exports, the largest Texas import in-
dustry—by a wide margin—is the 
electronics and electrical equipment
industry. Thirty-seven percent of Texas’
surface imports from Mexico are 
classified as electronics and electrical
equipment. Other important import in-
dustries include industrial machinery
and computers, transportation equip-
ment, instruments and apparel. This
correspondence probably arises from
the prominent role that maquiladora
firms play in transborder trade. (See the
box entitled “The Role of Maquiladoras
in U.S. Trade with Mexico.”)
Texas imports from Mexico have
been growing recently, although the
pace of that growth is much slower than
for U.S. imports from Mexico (Chart 2).
Between second-quarter 1993 and first-
quarter 1996, Texas surface imports
from Mexico grew at an average annual
rate of 3 percent, while U.S. surface im-
ports from Mexico grew at an average
annual rate of 19 percent.
Changes in Export and Import Demand
Recent economic changes—NAFTA,
the peso devaluation, the Mexican re-
cession and recovery—all have had an
impact on demand for Texas imports
and exports. However, these events have
influenced demand in different ways.
The expected demand effects of each
change are the focus of this section.
The implementation of NAFTA on
January 1, 1994, kicked off a series of
tariff reductions. Under the agreement,
tariffs on many traded goods immedi-
ately dropped to zero. Tariffs on re-
maining products will drop in stages
over the next five to 15 years. (Chart 3
illustrates the pattern of Mexican tariff
reductions.) Mexican tariff reductions
encourage demand for Texas exports
by lowering the effective price of Texas
goods. Similarly, U.S. tariff reductions
encourage Texas imports by lowering
the effective price of Mexican goods.
Each step down in tariffs under NAFTA
should increase both Texas imports 
and exports.
After the sharp devaluation of the
Mexican peso in December 1994, Texas
goods became much more expensive
for Mexicans, while Mexican goods 
became much cheaper for Texans.
These price effects increased Texas 
demand for Mexican exports and re-
duced Mexican demand for Texas 
exports. The devaluation also triggered
one of the sharpest economic down-
turns in Mexican history. Mexican real
gross domestic product (GDP) con-
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  3
Chart 3
Pattern of Mexican Tariff Reductions Under NAFTA
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exchange ratetracted at an 18.2-percent annual 
rate between fourth-quarter 1994 and
second-quarter 1995 (Chart 4). The 
recession further reduced Mexican 
demand for Texas exports and may
have spurred Texas imports by encour-
aging Mexican producers to look
abroad for sales.
Since the middle of 1995, however,
conditions in Mexico have started to
turn around. The inflation-adjusted
value of the peso has regained more
than one-third of the devaluation losses.
In addition, Mexican real GDP grew 
7.2 percent between second-quarter
1995 and second-quarter 1996. A lead-
ing index for Mexico created by the
Dallas Fed and the Center for Interna-
tional Business Cycle Research indi-
cates that the expansion is likely to
continue for at least the remainder of
1996. This recovery implies a reversal of
previous demand shifts.
NAFTA’s Impact on Trade
NAFTA’s tariff reductions have not
had an obvious impact on Texas ex-
ports. Export growth was robust imme-
diately after NAFTA’s implementation,
but the 1994 growth rates were not un-
precedented. Moreover, the industries
that experienced large reductions in
Mexican tariffs generally were not the
industries that experienced surging ex-
port growth in 1994. For example, ex-
port growth slowed in 1994 for the
instruments industry even after Mexican
tariffs dropped to zero on more than 
70 percent of instruments exports on
January 1, 1994.
The effects of NAFTA are difficult to
discern because tariff rates are only one
of many factors influencing exports. For
example, Texas exports to Mexico are
also influenced by the purchasing power
of the peso, the relative health of the
Mexican and U.S. economies, and the
extent to which Texas producers can
sell products to the rest of the world.
To isolate the effects of NAFTA on
Texas exports, we rely on the histori-
cally strong relationship between U.S.
exports to Mexico and Texas exports to
Mexico. The tendency of changes in
Texas exports to move with changes in
U.S. exports implies that Texas exports
are probably influenced by largely the
same factors as U.S. exports. Moreover,
forecasts from a model of U.S. exports
do a reasonably good job of predicting
Texas exports since 1987. (For a discus-
sion of this U.S. model, see David
Gould’s article on page 6.) Because the
greater quantity of data available at the
national level permits more precise esti-
mates of NAFTA’s effects than are pos-
sible using Texas data, we use Gould’s
model of the national economy to esti-
mate these effects on Texas exports.
As expected, the model indicates 
that NAFTA boosted Texas exports
(Chart 5 ). By comparing actual exports
to Mexico with the level of exports that
could have been expected without
NAFTA, we estimate that NAFTA has
boosted Texas real exports by approxi-
mately 6 percent since January 1994.
However, given the substantial uncer-
tainty surrounding our estimate, it
should be interpreted as suggestive
rather than definitive.
There is no evidence that NAFTA
provided a comparable boost to Texas
imports from Mexico. Data limitations
preclude the use of a formal model to
estimate NAFTA’s effects on Texas im-
ports, but the contrast with the U.S. ex-
perience is suggestive. NAFTA seemed
to provide a boost to U.S. imports from
Mexico, which accelerated sharply after
the implementation of the treaty. Texas
imports did not follow suit; real surface
freight imports from Mexico grew only
1 percent in 1994. Without data on prior
years, we cannot know whether this 
figure represents an acceleration in im-
port growth, but it seems unlikely.
In sum, the import and export data
suggest that, so far, NAFTA has had a
TEXAS–MEXICOTRADEAFTERNAFTA  (continued)
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Chart 7
Peso Crisis’ Estimated Effect
On Texas Exports to Mexico
Billions of 1995 dollars,
(Quarterly data)
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Chart 5
NAFTA’s Estimated Effect 
On Texas Exports to Mexico
Billions of 1995 dollars,
(Quarterly data)
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Chart 6
Texas Imports from Mexico
Jump in Late 1994
Billions of 1995 dollars,
(Six-month moving average of monthly data)









1996 1995 1994 1993the difference between actual imports
since December 1994 and the level of
imports that would have occurred if 
imports had continued to grow at 
their 1994 rate. By this criterion, the
peso devaluation and subsequent 
Mexican business cycle fostered less
than 3 percent in additional imports
from Mexico. As a lower bound, if
Texas mirrored the U.S. pattern, the 
effect of the peso crisis on Texas im-
ports from Mexico was negligible.
Conclusions and the Outlook for Trade
Texas’ recent history of trade with
Mexico suggests that both NAFTA and
the peso crisis have affected the state’s
exports much more than its imports. If
NAFTA continues to have a greater in-
fluence on exports than imports, future
tariff reductions under the treaty should
boost Texas net exports as well as the
total volume of trade. Similarly, as the
peso crisis runs its course and the Mex-
ican economy improves, both Texas 
net exports and the volume of Texas
trade with Mexico should grow. Thus,





1 Throughout this article, we measure exports using data based on 
the state of origin of movement to port. All the trade data are adjusted
for inflation with 1995 as the base.
2 Nationally, transborder surface freight represents 92 percent of 
exports to Mexico and 86 percent of imports from Mexico.
3 Before deregulation, the wedge between interstate and intrastate
trucking rates pushed warehousing activity out of the state. Firms
would supply Texas from warehouses just over the state line in
Arkansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico. Trucking deregulation in 
January 1995 made it more attractive for firms to supply Texas 
customers from warehouses in Texas. Because surface freight 
imports are apportioned to the states according to their shipping
destinations, a shift toward Texas warehousing would increase the
Texas import numbers.
moderate effect on Texas trade with
Mexico. However, NAFTA is being im-
plemented in stages. While many tariffs
dropped to zero on January 1, 1994,
other decreases are being phased in
over a 15-year period. As tariffs fall, the
treaty’s effects should expand and be-
come more evident.
Effects of the Peso Crisis
The unexpected peso devaluation
and economic volatility that accompa-
nied it have had much more obvious
and dramatic effects on Texas–Mexico
trade than has NAFTA. Not surprisingly,
exports to Mexico declined sharply in
the wake of the December 1994 deval-
uation. In the first half of 1995, Texas
exports to Mexico declined at a 37-
percent annual rate. Meanwhile, surface
freight imports from Mexico increased
at a 9.4-percent annual rate (Chart 6 ).
Since then, however, Mexico’s economy
has regained ground, Texas exports
have resumed their robust growth and
Texas imports have fallen.
Again, we use forecasts from the
model of U.S. trade to estimate the
effects of the peso devaluation and 
its aftermath on total Texas exports to
Mexico. As Chart 7 illustrates, the peso
crisis damped what should have been
steep Texas export growth in 1995. 
We estimate that Texas exports to 
Mexico would have been approxi-
mately 31 percent higher had there
been no peso crisis.
The effects of the peso crisis seem 
to have varied dramatically across in-
dustries (Chart 8). For example, the 
crisis appears to have had a much
smaller effect on exports of electronics
and electrical equipment than on ex-
ports of transportation equipment or 
industrial machinery and computers.
The relative insensitivity of electronics
exports to fluctuations in the exchange
rate and Mexican income implies that
maquiladoras have an especially large
influence on Texas exports of elec-
tronics to Mexico.
Once again, the lack of data makes 
it difficult to pin down import effects. 
It is unlikely that all the increased 
Texas import growth in early 1995 is 
attributable to the peso crisis. Some of
that pickup may reflect the influence 
of trucking deregulation or NAFTA.
3
However, a plausible upper bound on
the effects of the peso crisis would be
“The outlook is bright for Texas trade with Mexico.”
s
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Chart 8
Top Texas Export Industries to Mexico
Different Reactions to Peso Crisis
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CrisisINCE THE 1994 mega-devalua-
tion of the Mexican peso and 
the ensuing economic crisis,
some critics of free trade have
claimed that the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
has failed miserably. To a degree, the
data appear to support their claim. In
1995, U.S. imports from Mexico grew
nearly 25 percent, but exports dropped
11 percent. Has NAFTA boosted trade
on both sides of the border, as its pro-
ponents claim, or has the free trade
agreement boosted only U.S. imports
from Mexico, as detractors argue?
Certainly, Mexico’s economic crisis
has something to do with the large de-
cline in exports to Mexico. But looking
at aggregate trade flows alone cannot
reveal how much the peso crisis may
have lowered trade or how much
NAFTA may have helped boost trade. 
In this article, I use statistical tech-
niques in an attempt to disentangle the
impact of these two events on
U.S.–Mexican bilateral trade flows. My
estimates suggest that, although U.S. ex-
ports fell 11 percent in 1995, in 1996
they are 12 percent greater than they
would have been without NAFTA. Im-
ports are nearly 3 percent greater then
they would have been without the trade
agreement.
Measuring Bilateral Trade Flows
Effects of NAFTA. During 1994, 
the year NAFTA took effect, and be-
fore the peso crisis, U.S. exports to
Mexico grew 22.9 percent and im-
ports from Mexico grew 23.7 percent.
That growth represented a healthy in-
crease in trade compared with growth
over the previous five years. From 1988
to 1993, U.S. exports grew 15 percent
and imports grew 12 percent annually,
on average. While some analysts have
attributed 100 percent of this robust
trade growth in 1994 to the effects of
NAFTA, doing so is a mistake. The true
effects of NAFTA actually may be much
more or less than that simple calcula-
tion would suggest. The reason is be-
cause NAFTA did not take place in an
economic vacuum.
Changes in the economies of the
United States, Mexico and the rest of
the world were under way as NAFTA
took effect and would have likely influ-
enced bilateral trade between the
United States and Mexico. For example,
U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP)
increased 3.5 percent in 1994, which
was positively related to an increase in
the supply and demand for all imports
and exports. As Chart 1 shows, U.S. im-
ports and exports to the world, exclud-
ing Mexico, grew faster in 1994 than in
the previous six years. In 1994, exports
grew about 12 percent and imports
grew over 23 percent. In 1993, exports
grew only about 1 percent, while im-
ports grew close to 7 percent.
Likewise, Mexican real gross domes-
tic product increased 5.1 percent and
the real value of the peso was quite
high in 1994; both factors would have
boosted U.S. exports to Mexico. As a re-
sult, NAFTA and its lower trade barriers
were unlikely to be the only influences
on bilateral trade flows.
To isolate the effects of NAFTA, one
must account for the effects of changes
in income, exchange rates and trade
with other countries.
1 Only then can
NAFTA’s impact on trade be discerned.
Thus, to measure the effects of NAFTA,
I estimate empirically a model of bilat-
eral trade flows that accounts for these
economic fundamentals.
Effects of the Peso Crisis. Once the
influence of changes in U.S. and Mexi-
can income, exchange rates and trade
with other countries are fully accounted
for in the model of bilateral trade 
flows, the effects of NAFTA can be as-
certained, even over the period of the
S
DISTINGUISHINGNAFTA FROMTHEPESOCRISIS
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“Has NAFTA boosted trade on both sides of the border,…or has the 
free trade agreement boosted only U.S. imports from Mexico?”
Chart 1
U.S. Trade with the World, Less Mexico













’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90 ’89 ’88peso crisis. NAFTA’s impact is evident
because the bilateral model accounts
for the impact of economic fundamen-
tals that would be affected by the peso
crisis, such as exchange rates and in-
comes. Therefore, it is possible to get a
good idea how NAFTA affected trade
independently of the peso crisis.
But another important issue, aside
from NAFTA, is what would have likely
happened to U.S.–Mexican trade had
there not been a peso crisis. Would
trade have continued to expand, or
would it have faltered anyway? To 
answer this question, one must esti-
mate what would have happened to 
the determinants of bilateral trade 
flows without the peso crisis.
The peso crisis likely had its
strongest effect on U.S.–Mexican bi-
lateral trade through its impact on 
Mexican production, prices and the
peso–dollar exchange rate. When the
peso was dramatically devalued on 
December 20, 1994, the price of 
Mexican products suddenly became
cheaper for U.S. residents to buy, while
U.S. products became more expensive
for Mexico residents. The likely result
was lower Mexican demand for U.S. 
exports and higher U.S demand for
Mexican imports. When the peso crisis
worsened, Mexico fell into a deep 
recession that probably further weak-
ened the country’s demand for U.S.
made goods.
I estimate the effects of the peso 
crisis by first examining the long-term
behavior of Mexican production, the
real value of the peso and Mexico’s
trade with the rest of the world. Once
the long-run movements in these vari-
ables are determined, the unusual
short-run effects of the peso crisis are
excluded from these variables and 
the variables are reentered into the
model to measure the crisis’ effects on
bilateral trade.
2
Effects of NAFTA and the Peso Crisis
NAFTA. Charts 2 and 3 show the 
estimated effects of NAFTA on bilateral
trade flows between the United States
and Mexico. As the green line in 
Chart 2 indicates, exports are estimated
to have grown faster than they would
have, had there been no trade agree-
ment. On average, U.S. export growth is
about 7 percentage points higher per
year with NAFTA.
While the increase in growth is not
extraordinary, the cumulative effect on
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7
Chart 2
NAFTA’s Impact on U.S. Exports to Mexico
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“I estimate the effects




the real value of the
peso and Mexico’s
trade with the rest 
of the world.”exports since NAFTA was implemented
is about $5 billion, or 12 percent 
more exports. Moreover, these effects
should continue to grow because the
phase-in of NAFTA’s trade-liberalizing
provisions is not scheduled to be com-
plete until 2009.
For U.S. imports, as shown in Chart
3, the boost from NAFTA is smaller. 
On average, import growth is about 
2 percentage points higher per year
with NAFTA. Since NAFTA became 
law, the cumulative impact amounts 
to about $1.8 billion in additional im-
ports, or about 3 percent more imports
because of the agreement.
3
The Peso Crisis. Charts 4 and 5
show what would have happened to
trade had the peso crisis not occurred.
Interestingly, while imports from Mex-
ico do not seem to have been affected
a great deal by the crisis, exports to
Mexico were. U.S. exports fell dramati-
cally, a decline that can be attributed
DISTINGUISHINGNAFTA (continued)
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Chart 4
The Peso Crisis’ Impact on U.S. Exports to Mexico
Billions of U.S. dollars
Exports without peso crisis
Exports









NAFTA’s Impact on U.S. Imports from Mexico
Billions of U.S. dollars
Imports without NAFTA
Imports












for the effects 
of other economic 
variables…NAFTA
has had an important
positive effect.…”entirely to the peso crisis. According to
the model’s estimate, exports would
have grown 22 percent without the
peso crisis, rather than decline by 11
percent, as happened with the crisis.
Why were the effects of the peso cri-
sis so great on exports to Mexico but so
slight on imports from Mexico? Exports
to Mexico were substantially influenced
by the dramatic decline in Mexican con-
sumer income. While the peso crisis
generated a dramatic recession in Mex-
ico, it had little perceptible effect on ag-
gregate U.S. income. The peso crisis not
only made U.S. goods more expensive
for Mexicans, it also was associated
with a sizable decline in their income.
As a result, U.S. exports to Mexico suf-
fered because of both an increase in 
relative price and a decline in Mexican
consumers’ income. NAFTA actually
helped mitigate the decline in exports
to Mexico that was inevitable, given the
size of the Mexican recession.
Conclusion
The dramatic decline in U.S. exports
to Mexico during 1995 can be traced to
the peso crisis and the contraction in
Mexican income, not to the effects of
NAFTA. The devaluation of the peso not
only made U.S. goods more expensive
for Mexicans, it also caused Mexican in-
come to fall. Both factors contributed to
the decline in U.S. exports to Mexico.
U.S. imports from Mexico, however,
were not significantly affected by the
peso devaluation.
After accounting for the effects of
other economic variables—U.S. and
Mexican incomes, prices, trade with 
the rest of the world and exchange
rates—I estimate that NAFTA has had
an important positive effect on U.S. ex-
ports to and imports from Mexico. 
Nevertheless, the largest gains from
NAFTA may be the most difficult to
quantify. Unlike conditions during pre-
vious periods of economic turmoil in
Mexico, trade has continued to be rela-
tively unimpeded during the peso crisis.
After the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico im-
posed heavy restrictions on all of its im-
ports in hopes of generating a trade
surplus to buy down its foreign debt. 
It also restricted capital outflows 
and nationalized the banking system.
NAFTA, by enhancing the economic ties
between the United States and Mexico,
likely limited capital outflow and
helped facilitate a return of foreign in-
vestment and economic growth. Mexico
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
Chart 5
The Peso Crisis’ Impact on U.S. Imports from Mexico
Billions of U.S. dollars
Imports without peso crisis
Imports
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sis now recovering from its deep reces-
sion. Exports to Mexico increased 6.9
percent and imports from Mexico in-




I wish to thank Baoyuan Wang for excellent research assistance and
comments. Mike Cox, Bill Gruben and Lori Taylor also provided
helpful comments. All remaining errors are my responsibility.
1 See the box entitled “Modeling NAFTA’s Impact: A Technical Appen-
dix” for a description of the author’s data and estimation technique.
2 Mexican industrial production, the real value of the peso and Mexi-
can trade with the rest of the world are estimated with a second-order
autoregressive model that includes a dummy variable for the peso
crisis. Interestingly, after the effects of the peso crisis are excluded
from these variables, the model still predicts declines in Mexican in-
dustrial production and the real value of the peso, although the pre-
dictions are not as great as what actually occurred. The technical
appendix provides further details.
3 It should be noted, however, that while the effects of NAFTA are esti-
mated to be positive, the statistical margin of error in these separate
export and import figures is quite high. For the effects of NAFTA on
total trade (exports plus imports), the figures are much more pre-
cise—significant at the 10-percent level. The relatively short period
during which NAFTA has been in effect and the volatility introduced
into the data from the peso crisis makes more precise individual es-
timates for exports and imports difficult to obtain.
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Modeling NAFTA’s Impact:
A Technical Appendix
The bilateral trade model used in this study is estimated utilizing monthly
data from January 1980 through January 1996. All variables are seasonally
adjusted and expressed in log first differences:





*t–i + a7D88 + a8N + e, and





* t–i + b7D88 + b8N + m,
where M is U.S. imports from Mexico, X is U.S. exports to Mexico, I* is 
Mexican industrial production, I is U.S. industrial production, E is the real
peso–dollar exchange rate, M
–
is total U.S. imports excluding those from
Mexico, X
–
is total U.S. exports excluding those to Mexico, M
–
* is total 
Mexican imports excluding those from the United States, X
–
* is total 
Mexican exports excluding those to the United States, D88 is a dummy 
variable for the recent period in which Mexico began opening up to foreign
trade and started its macroeconomic stabilization program. It equals 1 
beginning in January 1988. N is a dummy variable for the period in which
NAFTA was implemented. It equals 1 beginning in January 1994. e and m
are iid error terms.
The equations were estimated with ordinary least squares and the errors
terms checked to see if they followed a white noise pattern. The lag struc-
ture of the equation was determined according to Akaike information cri-
terion. To determine how trade has grown with NAFTA, the estimated
coefficient on the dummy variable for N was excluded from the exports and
imports equations and then these trade flows were dynamically forecast.
To estimate the effect of the peso crisis, secondary equations were esti-





VARt = g + g1VARt –1 + g2VARt –2+ g3D82 + g4D85
+ g5PESO + g6PESO *TIME + d,




*, D82 is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 during the 1982 debt crisis and 0 otherwise, D85 is a dummy vari-
able that is equal to 1 during the 1985 recession and 0 otherwise, PESO is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 during the 1995 peso crisis (December
1994 to May 1995) and 0 otherwise, PESO *TIME is an interaction term of
the peso crisis dummy variable with a time trend, and D is an iid error term.
To estimate the effects of the peso crisis, I calculate each estimated vari-
able excluding the effects of the variables PESO and PESO *TIME.These
forecasted variables were then used in the primary trade equations to 
estimate how trade would have evolved had the peso crisis not occurred.
s
bank of dallas bank of dallas
sout h w e s
t
economy
federal reserve federal reserve
southw e s t
economy
Southwest Economy Issue 5 is
special both because of its NAFTA
coverage and because it debuts a
new design. Go online and tell us
your thoughts about the content
and format—and find back issues
about NAFTA and many other
aspects of the economy—at
www.dallasfed.orgFurther Information on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash,
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons April–June 1996 Index, January 1981 = 100
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index (TIPI)
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
FTER A WEAK first quarter, Eleventh District em-
ployment accelerated in the second quarter to just
above its long-run average growth rate of 3 percent.
Economic activity is now showing signs of decelerat-
ing slightly, however. The expansion is being damp-
ened by a slightly slower national economy and a
brief second-quarter jump in mortgage rates. Still, continuing
expansion of most high-tech industries and the recovering
Mexican economy will help keep job growth in the second
half of the year above the rate averaged in the first half.
(Growth rates have been annualized.)
After 2-percent job growth in the first quarter, District em-
ployment growth jumped to 3.2 percent in the second quar-
ter. The surge in job growth occurred entirely in Texas, where
employment growth increased from a sluggish 2 percent to
3.7 percent. In contrast, Louisiana employment growth
slipped from 1.1 percent to 0.3 percent, while New Mexico’s
job growth took a respite from a torrid 5.4 percent in the first
quarter to 4.3 percent in the second quarter.
A
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment Total nonfarm employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
6/96 116.3 121.4 153.3 424.6 1,044.4 1,472.6 5,161.3 8,256.2 1,794.5 718.9
5/96 116.6 121.3 153.5 424.0 1,043.3 1,469.9 5,142.1 8,232.8 1,793.5 716.0
4/96 116.8 121.4 152.4 422.9 1,042.0 1,468.2 5,122.8 8,208.3 1,792.2 712.2
3/96 116.2 122.0 153.2 423.0 1,039.5 1,466.1 5,098.9 8,180.7 1,793.1 711.4
2/96 115.0 120.6 154.1 423.0 1,040.5 1,464.2 5,076.5 8,158.3 1,794.0 711.8
1/96 114.1 120.5 152.2 422.9 1,043.1 1,461.4 5,061.0 8,140.6 1,795.3 710.1
12/95 113.6 119.6 154.1 418.8 1,038.5 1,461.4 5,068.4 8,141.2 1,788.1 702.1
11/95 113.7 119.6 154.3 416.1 1,034.0 1,457.8 5,047.9 8,110.1 1,788.4 699.5
10/95 114.4 119.8 154.8 413.5 1,031.1 1,455.4 5,026.0 8,080.8 1,788.2 694.8
9/95 115.0 119.5 155.4 412.0 1,032.1 1,452.9 5,011.9 8,064.3 1,791.1 691.5
8/95 115.0 119.9 155.3 408.1 1,029.3 1,458.9 4,989.6 8,041.2 1,775.1 689.1
7/95 114.7 120.0 155.1 404.9 1,026.3 1,449.3 4,965.5 8,001.1 1,774.1 686.2
s
Employment growth in Texas gained momentum as the na-
tional economy bounced back in the second quarter. The
state’s job growth in the electronics industry was an excep-
tion to this trend, however, as weaker than expected demand
for computers and an oversupply of semiconductors led to
several layoff announcements. The construction sector also
began to show signs of deceleration, although single-family
homebuilding remained at very high levels. Construction em-
ployment growth slowed to 1.5 percent, after surging to 5.8
percent in 1995.
In the second half of the year, District employment will
likely grow near its long-run average rate. The Texas Leading
Index declined in May and June, after showing strong gains
through the first four months of the year. Declines in the lead-
ing index suggest some moderation in the second half from
growth posted in the second quarter. Growth should remain
stronger than the 2.6 percent posted in the first half, however,
and faster than that of the rest of the country.
—Fiona Sigalla
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A New Tool to Increase Examiner Efficiency
Federal Reserve bank examiners are beginning to use new software to make examinations more efficient and less bur-
densome for financial institutions. Called Examiner Workstation, this new tool allows examiners to utilize electronic data
from the financial institutions’ databases, eliminating the need for time-consuming manual transcription.
In Release 1.1, Examiner Workstation contains functionality for the electronic accumulation of loan data.The application
will eventually encompass all facets of the bank examination, including the analysis of the securities portfolio, the elec-
tronic completion of work papers, report-generation activities and financial analysis based on the bank’s Call Report.
With the electronic accumulation of data, examiners can analyze this data off-site and use it to help focus on-site work
on larger issues, such as risk management.“Bankers encouraged us to use technology more effectively during the exam
process,” says Dallas Fed Vice President W. Arthur Tribble. “Loan analysis is a very manual function and takes a lot of
time. We think we have a product that is a win–win for the banker and the examiner: less time spent in the bank with
better analysis and insight.”
The Federal Reserve’s 12 regional banks supervise state member banks and bank holding companies in their 
respective districts. Examiner Workstation, when in use throughout the Federal Reserve System, will promote standard-
ization of examinations across the United States. Additionally, each state’s bank regulatory agency has been provided
with a copy of Examiner Workstation for use on examinations. State member banks interested in the use of this tool on
their next examination should contact Danny Oursbourn at the Dallas Fed at (214) 922-6235.